



# Setting Up Compute Infrastructure for Sensitive Data

Yohai Meiron, Scientific Applications Analyst  
Shawn Winnington-Ball, Manager, Information Systems Security

SciNet, University of Toronto  
13 Nov 2024





## Agenda for today

1. Intro to SciNet and S4H
2. Technical overview
3. Compliance overview



## What's S4H?

- Secure enclave at SciNet for HPC jobs involving sensitive data
- Orphan initialism formerly meaning 'SciNet4Health'
  - Not limited to the health space, and renaming talks are underway



## What's sensitive data?

- We use the UofT data classification standard for guidance
- Level 4 data:
  - *Highly sensitive research data, requiring stronger security controls, whose unauthorized access, disclosure, or loss poses significant financial, reputational, legal or physical risk to the data subject, researcher, University, etc.*
- Data custodians are rightly concerned with the distribution of this data to parties that can guarantee a secure and stable environment



## With whom are we working on this?

- U of T Research Information Security
  - Michael Laurentius, and formerly Sue McGlashan
  - Giving us guidance on compliance and helping us navigate the overall landscape
- With the support of VP Research & Innovation, and Information Technology Services



## Why this?

- Researchers indicated a need for hosting sensitive data that our main cluster Niagara (now Trillium) is not intended to host
- Other related projects include:
  - HPC4Health
  - Health Data Nexus
  - Ontario Health Data Platform (OHDP) (ret.)
  - T-CAIREM
  - SecureData4Health

# S4H: THE TECHNOLOGY

Yohai Meiron



## WHAT IS SciNet ?

We are the supercomputing centre at the University of Toronto.


We provide Canadian researchers with computational resources and expertise necessary to perform their research at scale.



We operate the *Niagara* supercomputer, as well as several other systems.  
(Soon to be replaced by the brand new *Trillium* system)



# BALANCING SECURITY AND USABILITY



- Air-gapped system (“Fort Knox” approach)
  - Users have to go in person to a secure facility to do their work
  - Data go in and out on physical media under the supervision of the admins
- No cybersecurity precautions (“open house” approach)
  - Security through obscurity mostly
  - Unacceptable to data custodians
- Niagara already has some security measures in place
  - SSH keys only authentication (no passwords)
  - Mandatory 2-factor authentication (2FA)
  - Security patches applied to system in a timely manner
  - Admins monitoring for suspicious activity
  - Reasonable physical security measures

# WHERE DOES NIAGARA FALL SHORT?

- Users
  - Come from a huge pool of potential users
  - Are minimally vetted
  - May connect from anywhere in the world
  - Can run arbitrary code
  - Make mistakes
    - `chmod -R 777 ~`
    - Rstudio server 😬
- Data lifecycle
  - No encryption at rest
  - Backup in multiple copies (Home & Project)
  - No secure disposal mechanism

# THE S4H SECURE ENCLAVE

Addresses *some* of the security concerns

- Hardened access
- Encryption at rest
- Group isolation
- Data egress control (select groups)

Striving to provide a *similar experience* to Niagara

- It's an HPC environment, not cloud!
- Similar nodes
- Access to the same software
- Support from the same team at SciNet

## THE S4H SECURE ENCLAVE (CONT.)

- Not a “Fort Knox” solution
  - Better than Niagara
  - We still make compromises for usability
  - Satisfactory level of security for our users


### CURRENT STATUS



Pilot project at the University of Toronto

- Available for free for groups at UofT
- Online since July 2023
- 5 groups onboarded


# HARDENED ACCESS: FIREWALLING AND AUTHENTICATION



# ENCRYPTION AT REST

- Parallel file system (IBM Spectrum Scale, a.k.a. GPFS)
- Key management server (for AES-128 keys)

Can I enjoy encryption on Niagara or the other systems?




Yes! But it's not straightforward.

More details in my colloquium from last year

<https://youtu.be/xwXXknJbmmE>


- You can use software encryption fully in user space
- That's in contrast to “native” GPFS encryption in S4H
- Takes some time and expertise to set up
- Onus is on you to do it correctly
- **Cybersecurity is more than just encryption at rest**

# ENCRYPTED JOB FLOW



# GROUP SEGREGATION ON THE LOGIN NODE

- The login node is an actual shared resource
- OS-level virtualization (container technology)
  - Containers are processes with reduced visibility to the host
  - System resources utilization control with cgroups
  - Each user gets their own container instance
  - Fully in userspace (no `setuid` or capabilities)








## The Compliance: Shawn



# Compliance

- How do we know how 'secure' we are? Is there a manual of sorts, a yardstick by which we can measure?
  - Yes, many: SOC2, ITSG-33, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, CMMC, etc.
- Our own opinion of our cybersecurity stance and effectiveness isn't enough; we need to demonstrate to outside parties that we can be trusted to host sensitive data and not put UofT on the front page
- We follow UofT's *Information Security Control Standard*, which is based on CMMC, which is based on NIST 800-171 rev. 2



## NIST 800-171 rev. 2

*This publication provides federal agencies with **recommended security requirements** for protecting the confidentiality of CUI when the information is resident in nonfederal systems and organizations. (<https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/171/r2/upd1/final>)*

- CUI ~ Controlled Unclassified Information
  - *CUI is sensitive information that does not meet the criteria for classification but must still be protected (<https://www.dodcui.mil/>)*
- Set of 110 security controls in 14 categories that span all aspects of cybersecurity
  - Many technical, many documentation
  - Most organizations already have many of these controls to some degree



## CMMC

- Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification
- U.S. defense industry requires that all contractors achieve a certain level of cybersecurity maturity: makes sense given the sensitive nature of their industry
- Basically a compliance framework centered around the controls in NIST 800-171
- The standard itself is simply a set of security requirements; CMMC provides the structure:
  - Contract language, professional accreditation, assessment process, scoring methodology, etc.



## CMMC con't

- Note that no organization or data custodian is requiring us to follow CMMC
  - In the absence of a directive or generally accepted practice, this was our choice
- NIST is fairly well-known in academic circles
  - <https://www.regulatedresearch.org> CoP
- In fall 2023, the Canadian government announced the Canadian Program for Cyber Security Certification (CP-CSC), which is essentially CMMC fitted to the Canadian landscape, intended for use by Canadian defence contractors working with their U.S. counterparts



## SciNet compliance journey

- Familiarizing ourselves with the control set by reviewing it as a team
  - Some ambiguity in the requirements and for good reason (they have to be agnostic to cover all manner of environments and technologies)
- Added some management metadata to each control to track our notes, relative difficulty, predominantly technical or policy, responsibility, etc.
- Initial impressions: 800-171 is very thorough, covers all aspects of cybersecurity, and focuses a lot on documentation: *if it's not written down, it doesn't exist*
- Policies and corresponding procedures are important



## SciNet compliance journey con't

- System Security Plan (SSP)
  - Where all aspects of site security are documented directly or linked
    - Diagrams, technologies, per-control summaries
  - Think of it as a table of contents
  - Give this to an assessor and they will quickly get an idea of your posture
- Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms)
  - Anything that isn't an immediate 'pass' is something that needs add'l work and this effort needs to be documented



## SciNet self-assessment against NIST 800-171

- Two templates, briefly
  - SciNet original
  - U of T Trusted Infrastructure Framework assessment





## Next steps

- Complete internal assessment against NIST 800-171 performed by U of T Research Information Security
  - Michael Laurentius will wear his CMMC assessor's hat
  - We need to meet some 'acceptable' level of compliance, TBD
- Continuing to onboard S4H clients with L3 data, for which we are approved
- Find clients willing to bring their L4 data and do what's needed to gain their trust
  - Marketing effort required
  - S4H security statement has been drafted and approved



## Next steps con't

- Develop new user onboarding process
  - We know the rough steps already through onboarding with existing clients
  - Lots of back and forth with U of T departments, data custodians
  - How can streamline as much of this process as possible?
- Investigate cost, scope, necessity of privacy impact assessment, threat risk assessment, and penetration testing as external third-party reviews
  - Technical architecture may change as a result



# Thank you!

- [dgruner@scinet.utoronto.ca](mailto:dgruner@scinet.utoronto.ca)
- [swball@scinet.utoronto.ca](mailto:swball@scinet.utoronto.ca)
- [yohai.meiron@scinet.utoronto.ca](mailto:yohai.meiron@scinet.utoronto.ca)